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Abstract 
In this paper, I question the unspoken assumption in historical theory that there is a tradeoff 
between language or narrative on the hand and experience or presence on the other. Both critics 
and proponents of historical experience seem to presuppose that this is indeed the case. In this 
paper, I argue that this is not necessarily true, and I analyse how the opposition between language 
and experience in historical theory can be overcome. More specifically, I identify the necessary 
conditions for a philosophy of language that can be the basis for this. Secondly, I will also suggest and 
present one specific instance of such a solution. I argue that the existential philosophies of language 
of Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas can be exactly the kind of theory we need. For Buber and 
Levinas, language is not a means of accessing reality, but rather a medium of encounters between 
human beings. I present Levinas’ and Buber’s arguments, discuss how their views could be applied to 
the writing of history and what the resulting picture of the writing of history could look like. 
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Introduction 
 
In the twenty-five years after 1970 so much was achieved by theorists in revising the epistemological basis of historical 
work that they understandably lost sight of its object. The past-in-itself became an absence, a nothingness, a page on which 
to write, a place for dreams and images. A constructed factuality announced itself as the past’s sole presence, 
representation is only strangulated voice, colligation its distant tyrant.
1
 
For the last decade or so, recognition has been spreading that the linguistic turn that had motivated much advanced work 
in the humanities is over. The massive tide of language that connected analytic philosophy with pragmatism, anthropology 
with social history, philosophy of science with deconstruction, has receded; we are now able to look across the sand to see 
what might be worth salvaging before the next waves of theory and research begin to pound the shore.
2
  
These quotes from papers by Michael Roth and Michael Bentley are of course far from a neutral 
description of the state of the field of theory of history. They are two miniature pieces of substantial 
philosophy of history about the discipline of theory of history itself, and (as substantial philosophy of 
history is prone to do) they disguise a particular programmatic agenda as a claim about the course of 
history itself. Nevertheless, Bentley and Roth’s comments are a sign of the times. After almost forty 
years of research from a narrativistic point of view, the time has come to evaluate this tradition. This 
does not necessarily mean that the narrativistic turn in theory of history is passé.  Some might even 
argue that the real linguistic and narrativistic turn, a true and radical application of the insights of 
post-structuralist philosophy and/or Whitean narrativism, has not even yet begun.3 Plausibly, the 
majority of theorists of history will probably still be appreciative of the accomplishments of 
narrativism, but might also want to take its insights into new and uncharted territories. In any case, 
there is little doubt that narrativism is still an important approach or ‘school’ within theory of history. 
Nevertheless, narrativism is no longer alone, and perhaps not even dominant anymore. Recently, 
several new approaches within theory of history have come to the fore, and if we want to address 
the question of the legacy and the future of narrativism, one of the most central questions is how 
narrativism will relate to these new kids on the block. 
Perhaps the most prominent alternative for the central position of narrativism within theory of 
history is the group of theories clustering around the notions of ‘historical experience’ and 
‘presence’. In the last fifteen years, there has been a boom in the number of publications on 
historical experience and experience-related notions4. Theorists such as Frank Ankersmit, Eelco Runia 
and Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht have developed these concepts in order to describe and advocate a 
more personal, direct, authentic and intuitive, and less intellectualized and scholarly relation with the 
past.5 However, the rise of historical experience and ‘presence’ as has also been met with concern 
and controversy, particularly from scholars strongly inspired by narrativism, postmodernism and the 
linguistic turn. Much of this criticism has to do with the way presence and historical experience deal 
with language. Narrativists and other theorists of history sympathetic to the linguistic turn are afraid 
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that ‘presence’ and ‘historical experience’ could make us forget narrativism’s insights about the 
nature of historical representation and historical writing that have been so important for the field of 
theory of history since the 1980’s. The central insight of narrativism was that historical 
representation is always underdetermined by the historical facts, and hence, historical writing is 
always as least as much the result of linguistic conventions and the imagination of the historian than 
of the historical facts or the past itself. This allowed theorists of history to develop an ideological 
critique of history-writing: historical representations that were presented as the past or the historical 
facts themselves could now be unmasked as programmatic writings, motivated and determined by 
linguistic conventions and underlying ideological assumptions. Hence, the claims, made by 
proponents of presence and historical experience, of the possibility of a direct contact with the past, 
actually seem to be a full-out attack on narrativism. It is therefore not surprising that the rise of 
‘presence’ and ‘historical experience’ has been met with scepticism, and in some cases even with 
outright hostility, by theorists loyal to narrativism and the linguistic turn. In a recent volume on 
‘presence’, for example, Vincent Pecora expresses serious doubts about presence’s claim of being 
able to escape the prison house of language, and Susan Crane is sceptical about the idea the past 
might, in some way or other, ‘speak for itself’.6 In a book-length discussion on the work of Frank 
Ankersmit, Peter Icke states that the notion of historical experience re-introduces the idea of a direct 
an unproblematic access to the past itself, in this way sidestepping the accomplishments of 
narrativism in criticizing the realist assumptions of history writing.7 Paul Roth more or less agrees 
with Icke, and fears for the fact that an appeal to historical experience as the foundation of historical 
enquiry might ignore the subtleties of philosophy of language that philosophers have developed 
since the linguistic turn.8 Keith Jenkins, on the other hand, is afraid that the attention for historical 
experience might result in a gloomy and pessimistic form of navel-gazing with little or no attention to 
the ideological context of history-writing, or to the critical function of theory of history.9 And 
although they express it in a much less vehement way, Ethan Kleinberg, Rik Peters and Berber 
Bevernage express a similar concern with respect to the concept of presence: the emphasis on 
‘letting things be’ or ‘letting things speak for themselves’ might endanger the critical and 
emancipatory potential of theory of history, they say.10  
In this paper I will leave aside the question whether these criticisms, concerns and attacks are 
justified or not, and focus on a more shadowy side of the experience versus language debate. More 
specifically, I want to highlight and investigate an unspoken assumption, shared by both parties, that 
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goes unnoticed all too often: the idea that there is a necessary trade-off between language and 
experience.  
The large majority of critics of experience and presence almost automatically assume that there is a 
trade-off between narrativism, language, meaning or representation on the one hand, and 
experience or ‘presence’ on the other. The more historical representation there is, the less historical 
experience has a chance of manifesting itself, and vice versa. Hence, the rise of historical experience 
and presence is thought to entail a danger for narrativism and its accomplishments. This is in part an 
explanation for the fierceness of some of the criticism direct to historical experience and its 
proponents. Surprisingly, this is the one point on which the new theorists of presence and historical 
experience actually seem to agree with their critics. The concepts of presence and historical 
experience are often defined in direct opposition to the notions of narrativism or historical 
representation.  
Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht, for example, envisages a rather sharp distinction between cultures oriented 
towards meaning and those tending towards presence.11 The first kind is based on an ‘eccentric’ view 
on human subjectivity: the subject stands outside of the world, looks at it from a bird-eye’s view, and 
endows the objects and events it observes with meaning. The second type sees human existence as 
fundamentally in the world, and between the events, objects and beings of that world. The world is 
not a phenomenon to be observed, but rather an event to take part in. Hence, Gumbrecht’s 
distinction between cultures oriented towards ‘meaning’ and those based on ‘presence’ relies on a 
spatial metaphor: the distinction between inside and outside. And as a result, ‘presence’ and 
‘meaning’ are mutually exclusive: one simply cannot be close by and far off at the exact same time. 
Gumbrecht does of course cite a number of occasions in which language in which language or 
meaning on the one hand and presence on the other can be intertwined, such as the language of the 
mystic, or the presence of spoken words in their audible form. Nevertheless, these are cases in which 
language and experience (not unlike Romeo and Juliet) overcome the barrier that separates them for 
a brief and special moment. This does not at all mean that the barrier is not there, quite the contrary 
even. Situations such as the ones Gumbrecht describes are always exceptional12, and not really 
relevant for the everyday ways we deal with the world or, for that matter, with history.  
Eelco Runia as well makes a clear-cut distinction between representation and experience, or 
presence. Just as Gumbrecht, he states that there are two essentially different ways in which we can 
relate to the past. The first is based representation and meaning: it is the linguistic operations which 
we humans use to come to terms with the surrounding world in general, and with the past in 
particular. In this way, we are active, and the past is passive: we endow the past with meaning in 
order to be able to live with it and create a collective self-identity.13 The second, however, is a way in 
which we are passive, and the past takes in an active form. In some cases, the past can influence us 
on an unconscious level, and manifest itself in the way it steers our actions. Runia’s most famous 
example is the report written by the Dutch historians of the NIOD commission on the role of the 
Dutch UN battalion in the Srebrenica massacre: because the historians unconsciously identified with 
the Dutch soldiers, they actually reproduced part of the conditions that had led to the massacre. 
According to Runia, the final report conveyed an atmosphere of ‘forget about it’, and refused to think 
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about the question of responsibility. In this way the past, the way of thinking that was present in 
Srebrenica, found its way into the present through the unconscious part of the minds of the 
historians of the NIOD. Another, somewhat more prosaic example, is the roll call ceremony that was 
held in order to commemorate Holocaust victims14. By simply reciting the names of the victims 
(rather than fitting them into a more complex form of representation), we allow something of their 
‘presence’ to manifest itself to us, so Runia says.  
The latter example already points to the fact that Runia believes there is a trade-off between 
language and presence. Presence needs language, but only as a vehicle, and the ‘thinner’ the 
linguistic and representative crust is that language places over the past, the better ‘presence’ has a 
chance of breaking through. For example, Runia states that modern commemorative monuments 
such as the Berlin Holocaust Memorial have a much stronger ‘presence’ in our world than 
nineteenth-century statues, precisely because are less ‘representative’: it is much less clear what 
they mean, and hence, they have a more unsettling presence in our world, as Fremdkörper that 
invade our everyday reality.15 Hence, just as Gumbrecht, Runia sketches a strict division between 
language and representation on the one hand, and presence on the other. Language and 
representation are conscious, while presence is unconscious. When language and representation are 
abundant, presence is absent and vice versa.16  
Even Frank Ankersmit, the godfather of the modern notion of historical experience, does not escape 
the sharp opposition between language and experience. Although his earlier notion of historical 
experience is quite diverse17, he started to define it in a more focused way as ‘sublime historical 
experience’ during the course of the 2000’s. Ankersmit’s notion of ‘sublime historical experience’ is 
very close to a form of collective historical trauma. It is a nostalgic longing for a past that is forever 
gone, as a consequence of a great rupture in which society gets split into a past and a present that 
are essentially different. Ankersmit’s typical example here is the French Revolution, which created 
the division between the modern world and the ancien régime. Ankersmit’s thesis now is that the 
writing of history arises as a consequence of this. Writing history is essentially a symptom of the 
problematic relation of a society with its past: the people of a society unconsciously long for the past, 
but at the same time realize that the past can never return. The compromise, then, is starting to 
write history, and represent the past through the means of historical representation.  
Just as Gumbrecht and Runia, Ankersmit’s notion of sublime historical experience implies a stark 
contrast between language and experience. Sublime historical experience is the starting point of any 
inquiry into history, while historical writing or representation is its result. So, although the two 
factors of the equation need each other (without historical experience, there would be no historical 
writing, and without historical writing, we would never know of the existence of historical 
experience), there is very little mutual influence: (sublime) historical experience is one thing, and 
historical representation is quite another.  
To summarize, according to the three most important supporters of historical experience and 
presence, experience and narrative are maybe not exclusive in an ontological sense (in the sense that 
                                                          
14
 Eelco Runia, Namen Noemen, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 119, 2006, 242-248. 
15
 Eelco Runia, Presence, History and Theory 45/1 (2006), 17. 
16
 Eelco Runia, Waterloo, Verdun, Auschwitz. De Liquidatie van het Verleden (Amsterdam, Meulenhoff, 1999), 
21.  
17
 Frank Ankersmit, De Historische Ervaring (Groningen, Historische Uitgeverij, 1993) 
both cannot exist simultaneously), but they are exclusive in terms of scope: if we study experience, 
or experience-related notions such as ‘presence’, we need not bother with the role of language, 
narrative or representation, and vice versa. In Gumbrecht’s spatial metaphor, presence is close-by, 
while language (or meaning) is far away. For Runia, representation is conscious and intellectual, while 
‘presence’ is unconscious and emotional. For Ankersmit, finally, experience is the starting point of 
historical enquiry, and representation is its end point. In all three cases then, language and 
experience are mutually exclusive: one cannot be close by and far off at the same time, something 
cannot be conscious at the same time, and the same thing cannot be simultaneously at the beginning 
and at the end of historical enquiry. 
In this sense, the critics of historical experience seem to be right, maybe not necessarily in their 
arguments, but at least in their concern: if narrative and experience are indeed mutually exclusive, 
then it is true that the rise of historical experience as a topic in theory of history is a threat for 
narrativism and its legacy. Even if (in the best case) the claims of historical experience do not directly 
contradict those of narrativism, then there is at a least a practical opposition: any attention devoted 
to historical experience is automatically attention that is not devoted to narrativism. As a result, even 
if the conclusions of narrativism and the linguistic turn might not openly be denied, they still run the 
risk of being neglected or forgotten. 
Language and Experience? 
But is this really necessarily true? Is there something intrinsic about experience and language that 
keeps them apart? Or is they a way to escape this seemingly unavoidable but still relatively 
unexamined, assumption? If there is, this could be important for the future of both narrativism and 
historical experience. If there is a way in which historical experience can be understood without 
standing into opposition to narrativism, language and representation, then the quarrel between 
narrativism and experience can come to a close, and theory of history can move on to the much 
more interesting, debate about how the insights of narrativism can be used and applied in other 
domains. 
Needless to say I believe there is such a way. More specifically, I believe it is possible to reimagine a 
concept of historical experience so that it does not require the binary opposition between experience 
and language used by Gumbrecht, Runia or Ankersmit. If such an account were possible, then this 
would entail that we have a concept of historical experience on our hands that this does not require 
an opposition to language or representation, and hence can carry the insights from the narrativist 
tradition beyond this tradition itself, and into a new area of research in historical theory. 
The best way to start thinking about this is by taking a look at two lesser-known theorists of historical 
experience, who have explicitly written about historical experience in a linguistic context, about a 
form of historical experience that is actually created by representational, ‘narrativistic’ means. The 
first is Andrew Abbott who, in 2008, wrote a paper ironically called ‘Against Narrative: A Preface to 
Lyrical Sociology’.18 Abbott, however, does not argue against the use of language or representation 
as such, but against a rather specific interpretation of ‘narrative’. Abbott defines ‘narrative’ as a way 
of writing that describes its subject as a gradually unfolding history, a story with a beginning, a 
middle and an end.19 Writing narratives such as these is a contextualizing enterprise, and happens 
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Hence, lyrical writing, the counterpart of narrative, is not itself a form of experience, but rather the 
re-creation of experience through linguistic means. And the experience it re-creates is not a kind of 
direct access to the past, nor a direct presence of historical reality. Rather, it is a specific state of 
mind of a specific individual, simply the way somebody feels when looking at social reality.  
My second example is the historian Adrian Jones. Jones pleads for a so-called vivid history, a history 
which evokes images of the past rather than posit claims or prove theses about it.21 He sees a parallel 
between the current way in which history is written and the situation in the beginning of the 
twentieth century against which the Annales-school was a reaction.22 The dominant way of writing 
history in the beginning of the twentieth century was fragmented, obsessed with detail and 
concerned with the analysis of texts rather than with an evocation of the past itself in its totality. 
There is a remarkable similarity between this situation and our current one since the linguistic turn, 
Jones states. History as such no longer exists; there is only class history, gender history,…23 In the 
same way, focus has shifted from what the past itself was like to how people have represented the 
past.24 (Jones 2000, 537). Jones then pleads for a reaction which is analogous to that of the founders 
of the Annales: a return to a way of writing history which has a sense of the past as a whole, as the 
evocation of a foreign world. He calls this way ‘vivid history’, and refers (among others) to Tacitus to 
illustrate what this means. The important thing about Tacitus and his writings was that he did not 
take in a contemplative, distanced and contextualizing point of view.  Tacitus was a traditional roman 
patrician full of noble ideals who saw himself confronted with a messy past full which seemed to 
contradict his ideas.25 Hence, the way he writes about this past expresses the outrage he feels when 
looking at it. Tacitus cannot contextualize the events from the past into some general narrative or 
explanatory scheme, since the scheme he has in mind (based on the nobility of Roman culture and 
patricianhood) fails to capture the historical events. Hence, he does not try to understand or 
contextualize the course of the past. Rather he describes the events not as part of a general process, 
but as events sui generis, and he expresses the moral outrage he feels when he looks at them. 
For us, the interesting thing is that Abbott and Jones, just as Gumbrecht, Runia and Ankersmit, try to 
formulate an alternative to the narrativistic way of looking at our relation with the past. They want a 
relation with the past which is less constructed, and more authentic, intuitive and experiential. But 
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unlike Gumbrecht, Runia and Ankersmit, they try to find this alternative within language rather than 
outside of it. Abbott and Jones do not talk about an unconscious (Runia) or unmediated (Gumbrecht) 
presence of the past, nor about a kind of traumatic collective nostalgia (Ankersmit). Rather, they try 
to formulate a different way of writing about the past: not something outside of language, but rather 
a different way of employing language, or historical writing, as a way to communicate and convey 
experience.  
The question then is: what does this entail exactly for the concept of historical experience? Abbott 
and Jones do talk about a way of writing that appeals more to the heart than to the mind. Hence, one 
could say that it would tend more towards experience and feeling, and less towards cognition and 
understanding. But can we genuinely name this form of experience “historical experience”? What 
exactly is it that is ‘historical’ about ‘historical experience’ in this sense? Do we mean to say that we 
‘experience’ the past? How can this be possible at all? And why would one way of writing be able to 
arouse or convey this and experience, and another one not?  
Let us start by supposing, for the sake of the argument, that there is indeed a way in which language, 
(or narratives) can arouse or convey some kind of experience of the past. Starting from the 
hypothesis will allow us to determine what its necessary preconditions are, and this in turn will 
enable us whether the idea of a language-friendly form of experience or presence makes sense. The 
first thing this hypothesis implies is that there should also be a way in which language does not 
convey experience. After all, if we would say that all forms of language create historical experience 
all of the time, we would have to redefine the concept of historical experience to such an extent that 
most of its substantive content would disappear. We would also lose the possibility of making a 
difference between different kinds of historical writing, and hence make any kind of critical or 
appreciative perspective on the writing of history impossible from the outset. This is, I believe, not 
what we want. Hence, the first precondition is in place: we need an account which distinguishes 
between two different functions of language, and we need an argument why one can arouse 
experience while the other cannot.  
A second precondition has to do with the representative abilities of language and narrative: if we 
want our experience to be a historical experience, an experience which is more than an experience of 
ink and paper (or pixels) and our own mental states, we need some way of arguing that language can 
transport something ‘authentic’ or ‘original’, an original meaning, or an authentic experience, from 
the past to the present. Hence, we are in need of philosophy of language that has a certain amount 
of trust in the ability of language to transport something essential or meaningful from the past to the 
present. Traditional theories of language, however, will not do. One could, for example, try to start 
from a classical correspondence theory of truth, and state that a certain piece of writing can create a 
historical experience in the minds of its readers when it adequately mimics the events or situations in 
the past it writes about. This is more or less what R.G. Collingwood stated in his ‘Principles of History’ 
and ‘The Idea of History’. This correspondence theory, however, has been severely discredited by 
both analytic (Quine and the later Wittgenstein) and continental (Derrida, Foucault and many others) 
philosophers of language, as well as by the narrativist tradition itself. It may be that some aspects of 
it can be salvaged, but even the strongest supporters of Collingwood will no longer support the 
strong interpretation of his theory sketched above. The narrativistic view of language itself, however, 
will not be of much help either. Narrativism is built on the core assumption that the written language 
of historical representation is first and foremost a human creation, and that its most important 
features are creative accomplishments of the author, and that there is no real meaning to be found 
in the past itself.  
Hence, if we truly want a theory of historical experience that allows for the creation of a genuine 
‘historical’ experience though written texts, we are in need of something different. We need a 
philosophy of language in which language is not seen as a representation or a distortion of reality, 
but rather as a way of conveying experience. We also need some kind of argument to be able to state 
that the experience conveyed in this way is indeed a genuine ‘historical’ experience, and not solely 
an experience of something in the present (such as the reader’s own state of mind, or the words on a 
piece of paper), that just accidently happens to be the consequence of reading a text about the past. 
Furthermore, if we as theorists of history want to make any difference at all for the actual writing of 
history, we also need a philosophy of language than can show us why conveying experience through 
language can be a good thing, and how we can distinguish it from a use of language which does not 
do it.  
There are different ways in conceiving such a philosophy of language. Adrian Jones himself has set 
some steps in this direction, by creating a conceptual division between language that aims to prove a 
thesis (of which the gospel of St John is the original example), and language that tries to convey or 
create a state of mind (embodied in the writings of Herakleitos).26 In his contribution to this volume, 
Zoltan B. Simon develops a phenomenological approach to the matter, and re-imagines historical 
writing as an expressive phenomenon that springs from an aesthetic form of historical experience.27 I 
do not hold anything against these promising proposals, and it might well be that there are even 
more possibilities to solve the matter that are as yet unexplored. In this paper, however, I would like 
to suggest a different route: I believe we can find a ready-made version of the philosophy of 
language we need in the existentialist philosophy of language of the Jewish philosophers Martin 
Buber and Emmanuel Levinas.  
Buber and Levinas on Dialogical Ethics 
Although there are some subtle and not unimportant differences between the philosophies of Buber 
and Levinas28, we can safely leave those aside for the purpose of this paper, and instead focus on 
what they have in common. Levinas and Buber both follow the spirit of existentialist philosophers 
such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Heidegger, and construct a philosophy that favours existence 
over essence. Whereas more traditional philosophers will start from a ontological picture of the 
world and use that to derive their views about concrete human life, existentialists always start from 
life itself, and use this as a foundation to build their philosophy. Hence, theoretical constructs such as 
science, politics or jurisdiction are not seen as standalone abstract constructions, but as parts of 
human life itself. The distinctive feature of Buber and Levinas then, is that they see human life as 
essentially relational. Contrary to other existentialist philosophers such as Heidegger, Kierkegaard or 
Sartre, they do not put an emphasis on the life-world of the individual. Rather, they see being 
essentially as being with others, as a process of meeting and relating to other human beings. This 
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means that life is, always and in essence, ethical. Or, in Levinas’ words: not metaphysics, but ethics is 
the ‘first philosophy’: the essence of the human condition and the necessary starting point of all 
philosophy.29 
It is important to note that both Buber and Levinas’ use of the term ‘ethics’ diverges significantly 
from its traditional use in ethics and moral theory. For the two Jewish philosophers, ethics has 
anything with following the right rules, creating happiness and well-being, or moulding one’s 
personality in the right way. Rather, ethics is essentially about the recognition of the other as a 
worthwhile human being, as a specific individual who is talking to me here and now, and who cannot 
be reduced to an instance of some general category. This means that the relation with the other is, 
both for Buber and Levinas, more a matter of experience than of behaviour or knowledge. It is not 
about performing the right actions or knowing the right rules. Rather, the encounter with the other is 
an experience of a singular event, an event that cannot be caught be a controllable procedure that 
can be used to predict or analyse it. What is interesting for us here is that both philosophers also 
have a more specific, existential view on language. Rather than looking at language as a way to 
represent reality to an observer, or as a means to communicate information, they see it at as way of 
living, of being in the world, and, first and foremost, of being with others. Furthermore, both Levinas 
and Buber also make a distinction between two different functions of language: one which creates 
and affirms the ethical (and therefore experiential) relation with the other, and one that denies or 
ignores it.  
For Martin Buber, the essence of the human condition is twofold, and is represented by one’s 
possibility to speak to two different word pairs: ‘I-You’ and ‘I-It’.30 The I that is able to say ‘you’ to the 
other and to the world in general is the I of engagement, sympathy, respect and responsibility, the I 
of an interpersonal, experiential and living world. The ‘I’ that says ‘It’, on the other hand, is the I of a 
world of impersonal things, of distance, objectivity and of general categories. One could be tempted 
to see the first pair as denoting our relation with people and the second that with material objects. 
Buber, however, is very clear about this: the two word pairs are functions of language and ways we 
relate to the world, and are not bound by the nature of the things they refer to. It is perfectly 
possible to say ‘you’ to nature (Buber gives the example of a tree and a cat)31 or to material reality 
(which is what happens in art32). On the other hand, it is also very well possible to say ‘it’ to our 
fellow human beings, for example when we use them only as a means to something else, or when we 
reduce them to nothing more than instances of a general kind, such as ‘customer’, ‘patient’, 
‘consumer’ or ‘voter’. The structural nature of the two central Buberian functions is language is 
particularly important for us, since it means that both ways of using language can, at least in 
principle, also be used with respect to our relation with the past.  
Emmanuel Levinas holds a view that is remarkably similar. Just as Buber, he distinguishes between 
two very different functions of language, namely ‘Le Dire’ or ‘The Saying’ and ‘Le Dit’ or ‘The Said’.33 
The Saying is language as it is used by concrete people in real, specific situations. It is fundamentally 
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open and creative: the meaning of words and expressions changes constantly, and are re-invented in 
every specific situation. Seen in this way, the openness and dynamic nature of language allow us to 
account for the uniqueness and the unpredictability of the other and the concrete moral situation. In 
Levinas’ own religiously inspired words: language has the ability to create ‘revelation’.34 ‘Le Dit’ (‘The 
Said’), on the other hand, refers to language as a solid and abstract system. Here, the use of language 
is subject to general rules, structures and hierarchy, and the contingent is always subsumed under 
some general, abstract term. Used in this way, language can suppress the otherness and uniqueness 
of the other that was created with the help of the Saying. 
Buber and Levinas on History 
There are several reasons why Buber and Levinas’ views can be very interesting for the discussion 
between narrativism and historical experience in theory of history. I have argued above that, in order 
to overcome the opposition between language and experience, we need a view in which language 
has the potential to create or convey experience. This is exactly what Buber and Levinas have to 
offer. Hence, it is not a coincidence that much of their description of the ‘You’ and the ‘Saying’ 
reminds us of the way theories of historical experience are presented. As said, the theorists of 
historical experience wanted a relation with the past which is more personal, direct, authentic and 
intuitive, and less intellectualized and scholarly. Traditionally, it has often been assumed that this 
implies a move away from language, and hence also from narrativism. But when we look again at this 
point through a Levinasian or a Buberian lens, things are very different. It just seems as if the 
theorists of historical experience just want to move from the ‘I-it’ to the ‘I-You’, or from ‘The Said’ to 
‘The Saying’. And actually, this does not imply a move away from language at all, but merely a move 
from one functionality of language to another. It is also a view which is compatible with the central 
insight of narrativism, namely the underdetermination of historical writing by the historical facts. As 
said, narrativists emphasize the fact that historical representation is always for a large part the result 
of linguistic conventions, as well as of the personality and imagination of the historian. Hence their 
suspicion of the concept of experience, which is often seen as implying a direct, definitive and 
unquestionable contact with the past. For Buber and Levinas, however, experience is no such thing. 
The experience of the encounter with the other is not an objective or universally valid experience. On 
the contrary, it is, by its very nature, always personal and contingent, and cannot simply be 
transferred from one situation to another. It is always deeply personal, and hence can only exist by 
the grace of the creativity and dynamic nature of language: by the fact that words, sentences and 
expressions do not have fixed meanings, but are created anew in every encounter with the other. 
Hence, this is exactly the dynamic and personal view on language and its use that narrativists 
employ.  
Reformulating the dilemma in this ways means that we have an answer to the questions surrounding 
Jones and Abbott’s accounts of the experiential dimension of historical writing. As said, both Abbott 
and Jones advocated a seemingly more experiential way of writing history, but it was unclear what 
this meant exactly: what was this ‘experience’ an experience of? With Buber and Levinas’ views, we 
now have a putative answer: it is an experience of a genuine encounter with another human being, 
made possible by linguistic means. And in the case of writing history, these linguistic means are 
exactly those that Abbott and Jones describe: the personal and engaged vivid or lyrical use of 
language by the historian. So, it may not be a direct experience of the other from the past in the very 
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strict sense. But it is still an experience of a genuine encounter with the other from the past, and 
hence something more than merely an experience of one’s own state of mind when reading a 
narrative. Hence, there is indeed a sense in which we can refer to this kind of an experience as a 
‘historical’ experience, since it really needs a contact or relation with the past and the people that 
live there as its central precondition.  
Some people might object, however, and say that this phenomenon might be ‘historical’ in some 
sense, but that it still isn’t a ‘real’ experience. Monika Fludernik for example prefers to talk about 
‘experientiality’, experience that has passed through an analytical or didactic reworking, rather than 
about ‘experience’.35 I have no problems with this, though I do suspect that the distinction between 
experience and experientiality might be easily deconstructed. Do not all forms of experience, even 
the seemingly direct and unmediated ones, require some level of conceptual ‘filtering’ or didactic 
reworking? In any case, this is not something I am concerned with in this paper, since in my view it 
does not really matter whether one names the phenomenon I am talking about ‘experience’ or 
‘experientiality’. 
Of course, the parallel between historical experience (or experientiality) and the Buberian or 
Levinasian experience of the encounter with the other is not as straightforward as that. First of all, 
Buber and Levinas’ theories are first and foremost  about an interaction between two people: myself 
and the other. In the writing of history, however, three parties are involved: the historian, the reader 
and the people from the past the historian writes about. The relation between the reader and the 
people from the past is mediated by the historian. Furthermore, Buber and Levinas were clearly 
thinking mostly about interactions between people in the present, and not about a relation between 
people in the present (the historian and the reader) with people from the past. So, even though 
Buber and Levinas might offer us a solution for the dilemma between language and experience, it is 
still not clear exactly what this would mean on a less abstract level. What would a Buberian or a 
Levinasian view, or more generally, a view from existentialist ethics, look like when applied to the 
writing of history? 
Part of the answer can be found in the writings of Buber and Levinas themselves. As I said, both 
philosophers developed their theories thinking primarily about interactions between people in the 
present. Nevertheless, they also made several small but important remarks in which they indicate 
that their analysis extends to our relation with people with the past as well. Buber mentions this 
when he talks about the concept of the ‘We’. In short, the ‘We’ is the community of people who are 
in a genuine ‘I-You’ relation with each other. The ‘We’ can include people from our vicinity, but also 
people who are far away. One should not understand as a concrete social entity, such as a family, a 
village or a nation. Rather, the ‘We’ is a kind of spiritual feeling of community, made possible by the 
ability of language, the spoken and written word, to transcend the boundaries of physical proximity. 
Hence, Buber also states that this ‘We’ can also include the people from the past36, the people 
historians write about. For Buber, the fact that our encounter with the people from the past is 
mediated by the language of the historian doesn’t really matter: every encounter with the other is 
                                                          
35
 Monika Fludernik, Experience, Experientiality and Historical Narrative. A View from Narratology, in Thiemo 
Breyer & Daniel Creutz, Erfahrung und Geschichte: Historische Sinnbildung im Pränarrativen (Berlin, De Gruyter, 
2010), 49-50. 
36
 Martin. Buber, Dem Gemeinschaftlichen Folgen, in Martin. Buber, Logos: Zwei Reden (Heidelberg: Lambert 
Schneider, 1962), 67. 
mediated by language anyway, and the fact whether the other is physically present or not does make 
a difference, but not an essential one.  
Levinas actually has a more sophistacted account to back this up: unlike Buber, he does make a more 
explicit distinction between an immediate, physical encounter with the other on the one hand, and 
one in which the other is not directly present, but represented by some kind of linguistic or 
conceptual system on the other. Levinas denotes the other in the latter situation as ‘The Third’, 37, 
the absent other or, in the words of Howard Caygill, the ‘spectral’ other. 38 Levinas’ typical examples 
of the Third are the other as represented in jurisdiction or politics. In the case of politics, the number 
of people in a community is simply too large to organize direct face-to-face meetings with everyone. 
Hence, we need to think of a structured system of political representation and the appropriate 
discourse that goes with it, such as representative democracy for example. In the case of jurisdiction, 
the problem of the large number of people is combined with the principle of justice: in order to make 
sure that people at different places and different times are treated equally and fairly, we need an 
ordered system of juridical concepts and, again, an appropriate form of discourse in order to employ 
them. Hence, it is only a small step to the representation of the other from the past: because the 
other from the past cannot be present in the present, we need a linguistic structure to represent her, 
and create the same kind of substitute encounter with the other that is constantly used and re-
created in politics and jurisdiction. 
This linguistic structure is exactly what the writing of history is, or at least what it can be. Levinas also 
seems to support this idea, by mentioning that the other from the past indeed has the status of the 
Third.39 True, Levinas is also very critical of the objectivist pretentions of some forms of history-
writing that do not approach the people they write about in an engaged way, as complex and 
worthwhile human beings40. But this is actually exactly what we need. As said, in order to transcend 
the opposition between language and experience, we need a philosophy of language that can 
distinguish between two functionalities of language: one which creates a distanced, third-person 
perspective (the one against which theorists of historical experience react) and another one which is 
in line with what they propose: an engaged, personal, emotional and experiential relation with the 
past. Hence, Levinas’ criticism of history-writing actually runs quite parallel to the objections of the 
theorists of historical experience to the narrativist tradition. Hence, it is no surprise that Levinas’ own 
point of view is in line with theirs as well.  
What, then, would be the result of all of this? If we follow Levinas and Buber’s leads, we can imagine 
a view in which the language of the historian can create a genuine encounter with the other from the 
past, an encounter that is not essentially different from the personal encounters we have with the 
people in the present. Of course, the writing of history is a mediating undertaking, but this does not 
mean that a genuine encounter with the other is impossible. By using an engaged and personal 
writing style, a style in which the historian shows her personal engagement with, and care for, the 
people she writes about, and in which other is represented as a complex and unique human being, 
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the historian can create at least some aspects of a genuine encounter with the other. When 
understood in this sense, language is not a means of ‘accessing’ or ‘disclosing’ the past itself, but 
rather a way of ‘being together’, so to speak, of the people in the present and the people in the past. 
Jones and Abbott’s descriptions of ‘vivid’ and ‘lyrical’ writing are examples of this: both theorists 
advocate a writing style that is hands on, personal and engaged, and the focuses on the telling details 
of human life, rather than taking in a bird’s eye, third person perspective. With Buber and Levinas in 
the back of our head, we can now say that this is a sense then in which a narrative, a historical text, 
can indeed create a kind of ‘historical experience’: not an experience of the past itself, but rather the 
experience of a genuine encounter with a fellow human being from another time.  
Summary and Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to identify a way to overcome the opposition between narrative and 
experience, and conceive of a way of formulating historical experience that is not adverse to 
language and narrative. I have argued that this way cannot be found in the most widespread versions 
of historical experience, namely the theories of Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht, Eelco Runia and Frank 
Ankersmit. This does not mean that their theories are not viable, or wrong. They might be perfectly 
suited to account for those kinds of historical experience that are indeed outside the use of 
narratives and language (in as far as this is possible). What it does mean however, is that if we want 
an account of historical experience that reserves a special role for language and hence might benefit 
from the insights of narrativism, their theories will not do. Nevertheless, Adrian Jones and Andrew 
Abbott’s ideas about ‘vivid’ and ‘lyrical’ ways of writing seem to suggest that this does not necessarily 
need to be the case, although it was still somewhat unclear what their theories could tell us about 
language historical experience as such. Hence, I have identified the necessary conditions for any 
philosophy of language that aims to be the basis of a conjunction of narrative and historical 
experience. Firstly, we need an account that can account for a way in which language, or narratives, 
can convey a form of experience that is not limited to the experience of one’s own state of mind 
when reading a narrative. And secondly, we also need a way to distinguish between a use of 
language that can convey this kind of experience, and another use that cannot, or that might even 
inhibit it. It is very well possible that there are several consistent philosophies of language that can 
take up this role. In this paper, however, I have chosen to highlight one of them. I have suggested 
that the existential philosophies of language of Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas can be exactly 
the kind of theories we need. For Buber and Levinas, language does not stand in the way of 
experience. On the contrary, it is the necessary medium to create the experience of the encounter 
with the other. The resulting picture is one in which the historian does not try to ignore or bypass the 
role of language or narrative construction, but rather uses language to its fullest extent as a means to 
create the experience of a genuine encounter between people from the past and those in the 
present. 
